Nssm224 Privilege Escalation Updated ((exclusive))

: Similar to folder permissions, if the service binary itself is world-writable, it can be replaced by a rootkit or reverse shell . 2. Exploitation Checklist

: If the nssm.exe binary or its directory has "Full Control" or "Modify" permissions for the "Everyone" or "Users" group, an attacker can replace the legitimate service binary with a malicious one.

: Ensure all service paths are properly quoted in the Windows Registry under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services . nssm224 privilege escalation updated

Before diving into the vulnerability, it is important to understand what NSSM is and why it is so widely used. — short for “Non‑Sucking Service Manager” — is a lightweight, open‑source utility that allows administrators to run any executable as a native Windows service. Unlike Microsoft’s built‑in srvany , NSSM provides robust features such as automatic service restarts, logging, and graceful shutdown handling. NSSM is especially popular because it works with any application — console apps, scripts, Java JARs, Node.js servers — without requiring any modifications to the application itself.

Mechanism C: Weak Service Permissions (SERVICE_CHANGE_CONFIG) : Similar to folder permissions, if the service

NSSM reads its configuration from the Windows Registry. Specifically, it looks at the Application string value inside the service's Parameters subkey to know what file to execute. If a low-privileged user has write access to this registry key, they can change the path to point to a malicious executable (like C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe or a custom payload), bypassing any strict permissions on the original application folder. Step-by-Step Exploitation Walkthrough Step 1: Enumeration and Identification

Even though NSSM 2.24 is an older version (last updated around 2018), it remains widely used. As of 2026, the exploitation methods have remained consistent, focusing on and path traversal . 1. Weak Permissions on the NSSM Wrapper : Ensure all service paths are properly quoted

Paths within C:\Program Files or C:\Program Files (x86) inherit secure permissions by default, but custom application roots (e.g., C:\Apps\ ) do not. Run a hardening script to clean up ACLs: powershell

The paper you mentioned likely provides more details on the vulnerability, including: